Contextual-Intentionality Theory of Scientific Explanation: A Theoretical Framework

Abstract

This paper presents a novel theoretical framework, termed the Contextual-Intentionality Theory of Scientific Explanation, which aims to elucidate the nature and structure of scientific explanations within specific contextual settings. Grounded in philosophical and cognitive science perspectives, this theory posits that scientific explanations are inherently context-dependent and intentionality-driven, reflecting the purposeful endeavors of scientists to uncover underlying patterns and causal mechanisms within complex phenomena. Drawing on insights from epistemology, philosophy of science, and cognitive psychology, we explore how contextual factors, such as background knowledge, theoretical frameworks, experimental design, and socio-cultural influences, shape the formation and interpretation of scientific explanations. Additionally, we discuss the role of intentionality, including scientists' goals, motivations, and epistemic aims, in guiding the selection, formulation, and evaluation of explanatory hypotheses. By advancing the Contextual-Intentionality Theory of Scientific Explanation, this paper contributes to a deeper understanding of the dynamic interplay between context and intentionality in the scientific enterprise, with implications for scientific methodology, education, and interdisciplinary research endeavors.